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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REDWOOD GYM, ALICE'S HEALTH STUDIO, 
CINDY'S GOLDEN TOUCH, GENTLEMEN'S 
QUARTERS, LYNN'S HEALTH STUDIO, 
GINGER'S HEALTH STUDIO, KELLY'S 
HEALTH STUDIO, KIM'S HEALTH STUDIO, 
CAVALIER HEALTH STUDIO, and 
CONTINENTAL HEALTH STUDIO, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION, SALT 
LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, and 
SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT 
Defendants-Respondents. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 16833 
Appellants seek a declaratory judgment adjudging a Salt Lake 
County ordinance invalid and unconstitutional. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted respondents' motion for summary 
judgment and denied appellants' motion for summary judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek an order reversing the lower court's summary 
judgment in favor of the respondents and an order granting 
appellants' motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree with appellants' statement of facts. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS HELD THAT OPPOSITE-
SEX MASSAGE ORDINANCES DO NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES. THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF 
AUTHORITY FINDS MASSAGE PARLOR ORDINANCES PROHIBITING 
OPPOSITE-SEX MASSAGES TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Numerous state and federal courts have rendered decisions on 
the constitutionality of municipal ordinances that proscribe 
opposite-sex massages. Since 1943, when an appellate court in 
California handed down its decision in Ex parte Maki, 56 Cal App. 
635, 133 P.2d 64, holding such an ordinance constitutional, many 
jurisdictions have enacted similar ordinances and this area of 
the law has been exhaustively litigated. Patterson v. Dallas, 
355 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), appeal dismissed for want 
of a substantial federal question, 372 U.S. 251, 9 L.Ed.2d 732, 
83 S. Ct. 873 (1963); City of Houston v. Shober, 362 S.W.2d 886 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Connell v. State, 371 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. 
Crim. 1963); Gregg v. State, 376 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Crim. 1964); 
J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc., v. Lacey, 6 Wash. App. 43, 492 P.2d 600 
(Ct. App. 1971); Kisley v. Falls Church, 212 Va. 693, 187 S.E.2d 
168, (Va.Sup.Ct. 1972), appeal dismissed for want of a substan-
tial federal question, 409 U.S. 907, 93 S.Ct. 237, 34 L.Ed.2d 169 
(1972); Smith v. Keator, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203, (N.C.Sup.Ct. 
1974) appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 
419 U.S. 1043, 95 S.Ct. 613, 42 L.Ed.2d 636 (1974); Rubenstein v. 
Township of Cherry Hill, No. 10,027, unreported, (N.J. Sup.Ct. 
1974), appeal dismissed for wani of a substantial federal question 
417 U.S. 963, 94 S.Ct. 3165, 41 L.Ed.2d 1136 (1974); Colorado 
-2-
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Springs Amusements Ltd. v. Rizzo, 387 F.Supp. 690 {E.D. Pa. 
1974), rev'd, 524 F.2d 571 {3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 
913, 96 S.Ct. 3228, 49 L.Ed.2d 1222; Hogge v. Johnson, 526 F.2d 
833 {4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 913, 96 S. Ct. 3228, 
49 L.Ed.2d 1221; Cullinane v. Geisha House, 354 A.2d 515 {D.C. 
App. 1976), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923, 96 S.Ct. 3234, 49 L.Ed2d 
1226; Tomlinson v. Mayor and Aldermen, etc., 543 F.2d 570 {5th 
Cir. 1976); Thompson v. City of Huntsville, 329 So.2d 664 {Crim. 
App. 1976); Oueilhe v. Lovell, 560 P.2d 1348 {Nev. Sup. Ct. 
1977), dealing with opposite-sex wrestling; City and County of 
Denver v. Nielson, 572 P.2d 484 {Colo. Sup. Ct. 1977); City of 
Indianapolis v. Wright, 371 N.E. 2d 1298 {Ind. Sup. Ct. 1978), 
appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 439 
U.S. 804, 99 S.Ct. 60, 58 L.Ed.2d 97 {1978); 
With the exception of City and County of Denver v. Nielson, 
supra, and J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc. v. Lacey, supra, all of the 
decisions cited above uphold the constitutionality of opposite-
sex massage ordinances similar to the one here at issue. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that opposite-sex 
massage parlor ordinances do not violate the equal protection and 
due process clauses of the United States Constitution. In Hicks 
v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223, (1975), 
the Supreme Court ruled that a dismissal for want of a substantial 
federal question is a disposition on the merits. Therefore, when 
the United States Supreme Court dismissed Smith v. Keator, 
Rubenstein v. Township of Cherry Hill, Kisley v. City of Falls 
Church, and City of Indianapolis v. Wright, it determined that 
-3-
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opposite-sex massage ordinances did not violate the United States 
Constitution. 
This reasoning has been adopted by the federal circuit 
courts. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hogge v. Johnson, 
supra, at page 835 stated: 
Quite recently, the United States Supreme Court has 
spoken to the question among the circuits with respect 
to the meaning to be accorded dismissal for want of a 
substantial federal question. Such a dismissal is a 
decision on the merits binding upon the inferior federal 
courts. It is stare decisis on issues properly presented 
to the Supreme Court and declared by that Court to be 
without substance. 
The plaintiff in Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd., v. Rizzo, 
challenged Philadelphia's opposite-sex massage parlor ordinance 
upon the following grounds: that it failed to consider individuals 
on the basis of their own capacities, and instead unreasonably 
characterized the group to which individuals belong; that it 
established a constitutionally impermissible presumption that 
illicit sexual conduct was apt to occur when a customer was 
massaged by someone of the opposite sex; that it created a sex-
based classification and invidiously discriminated on that basis; 
that it would require them to violate the Civil Rights Act of 
1964; that it carved out a wholly irrational exception by exempting 
medical practitioners; that it abridged the fundamental right to 
pursue a livelihood by disenabling every licensed massagist from 
serving approximately fifty per cent of the public; and that it 
encroached upon an area--sex offenses--over which the Pennsylvania 
Legislature intended to exert sole control. After reviewing 
plaintiff's arguments, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated 
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at 524 F.2d 576: 
By parity of reasoning, we are not free to disregard 
three dismissals by the Supreme Court, for want of a 
substantial federal question, of challenges to ordinances 
identical in all material respects to the one in question 
here. A reading of the appeal papers shows that the 
orders dismissing the appeals in Smith v. Keater, 
Rubenstein v. Cherry Hill, and Kisley v. City of Falls 
Church are precedent for rejecting all but two of the 
contentions raised in opposition to section 9-610(4) of 
the Philadelphia Code. The dismissal by the Supreme 
Court in these three cases dispose of the plaintiff's 
claims based upon equal, but reprehensible, treatment 
of both sexes, an individually discriminatory sex-based 
classification, an irrational exception in the ordinance 
for massage treatments given under the direction of a 
medical practitioner, unreasonable abridgement of the 
right to pursue a legitimate livelihood, and the irrebut-
table presumption doctrine. Our reasoning in reaching 
this conclusion is supported by the similar approach 
taken by the Fourt Circuit in its recent decision in 
Hogge v. Johnson. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Tomlinson v. Mayor 
and Aldermen, held a Savannah ordinance constitutional based upon 
the rationale of the Third and Fourth Circuits in Colorado Springs 
and Hogge, respectively. 
The most recently reported case dealing with opposite-sex 
massage parlor ordinances to reach the United States Supreme 
Court is City of Indianapolis v. Wright. As in Smith, Rubenstein, 
and Kisley, the Supreme Court on October 2, 1978, dismissed for 
lack of a substantial federal question the appeal of Wright, dba 
Touch of Class Massage Parlor, and left standing the decision of 
the Indiana Supreme Court. In their decision, the Supreme Court 
of Indiana, after reviewing all of the major cases in the area 
concluded at page 1301: 
Having reviewed these decisions and their rationale, 
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it is unnecessary to pursue the parties' various consti-
tutional arguments for we are in agreement with the 
propositions and results of the overwhelming weight of 
authority which finds massage parlor ordinances prohibit-
ing opposite sex massages to be constitutional. 
In footnote number 1, at page 1301, the Indiana Supreme 
Court noted: 
Those federal cases which have found such ordinances 
unconstitutional were previous to the cited summary 
dispositions and are apparently overruled. Cianciolo v. 
Members of the City Council (E.D. Tenn. 1974) 376 
F.Supp. 719; Joseph v. House (E.D. Va. 1973) 353 F.Supp. 
367. 
As stated earlier, of all the cases cited in the parties' 
briefs and in the legal literature on this subject, [see, Annot. 
51 A.L.R. 3d 939 (1973)], there are only two that have not been 
directly overruled that hold such ordinances unconstitutional: 
J.S.K~ Enterprises v. Lacey, and City and County of Denver 
v. Nielson. J.S.K. Enterprises v. Lacey was decided by an inter-
mediate appellate court in the State of Washington in 1971, prior 
to the United States Supreme Court's summary dispositions cited 
above, and based its decision upon the belief that the subject 
ordinance '' ... constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex in 
contravention of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment of the United States Constitution." at page 607. The 
precedential value of the J.S.K. Enterprises decision was vitiated 
by the United States Supreme Court's rulings holding that such 
ordinances do not violate the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. 
This leaves only the case of City and County of Denver v. 
Nielson, wherein the Supreme Court of Colorado conceded that the 
ordinance did not violate the United States Constitution and 
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elected to interpret Colorado's constitution in such a way as to 
find the ordinance unconstitutional under the state constitution. 
The entire substance of appellant's case here rests on its suppli-
cation that this honorable court abandon the clear weight of 
legal authority throughout the United States and base its decision 
on one lone jurisdiction. This court has never held itself bound 
by the decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court; it was, however, 
shown such deference to decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court interpreting constitutional provisions similar to Utah's 
constitution. 
POINT II. THE SUBJECT ORDINANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
A. SIMILAR PROVISIONS IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH SHOULD BE SIMILARLY 
INTERPRETED. 
Appellants claim that the county ordinance, in addition to 
violating the federal constitution, violates the Constitution of 
the State of Utah. Appellants allege in their complaint that the 
ordinance in question violates Article VI (Legislative Department) 
and Article I, Section 7 (due process) of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah (see paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Complaint at page 
3 of the record). Without amending their complaint the appellants 
now raise, in this appeal, the argument that the ordinance also 
violates the Article IV, Section I, and Article I, Sections 2, 18 
and 24 of the state constitution. 
The due process clause of the Federal Constitution (5th and 
14th Amendments) and the due process clause of our state consti-
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tution (Article I, Section 7) are nearly indentical. The equal 
protection clause of the Federal Constitution (14th Amendment, 
Section 1) and the equal protection clause of our state constitu-
tion (Article I, Section 2) are dissimilar in their wording, 
however, their application has been equated in Purdie v. Universit 
of Utah, 584 P.2d 831 (1978). 
A state may choose to interpret its state constitutional 
provisions more liberally than the United States Supreme Court 
has interpreted similar federal constitutional provisions. As 
previously noted, this was the technique used by the Colorado 
Supreme Court in City and County of Denver v. Nielson, wherein 
the court ruled at page 485, supra: 
Regardless of the Third Circuit Court's decision 
in Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, supra, 
states may interpret their own constitutional provisions 
to afford greater protections than the Supreme Court of 
the United States has recognized in its interpretation 
of the federal counterparts to state constitutions. 
Shortly after the Colorado Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in City and County of Denver v. Nielson, the Supreme 
Court of Indiana handed down a decision that involved substantially 
the same issues, City of Indianapolis v. Wright. The Supreme 
Court of Indiana observed at page 1301, supra: "It is therefore 
settled that the due process and equal protection provisions of 
the federal constitution are not violated by massage ordinances 
as involved here." That court rejected the idea of interpreting 
the Indiana Constitution more liberally than the United States 
Supreme Court interpreted similar provisions of the federal 
constitution. The court, at pages 1300-1, supra, quoted from one 
of their earlier decisions: 
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It is the province of the state courts to interpret and 
apply the provisions of their state Constitutions, but 
where a provision of a state Constitution is similar in 
meaning and application to a provision of the federal 
Constitution, it is desirable that there should be no 
conflict between the decisions of the state courts and 
the federal courts on the subject involved. While a 
decision of the Supreme Court sustaining the validity 
of a state statute as not violative of any provision of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is not absolutely binding on 
the courts of the state when the statute is attacked as 
being in conflict with a provision of the state Constitu-
tion having the same effect, still, the federal decision 
in such cases is strongly persuasive as authority, and 
is generally acquiesced in by the state courts. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has long held the 
view that the United States Supreme Court's decisions on federal 
constitutional clauses are persuasive when it must interpret 
similar state constitutional provisions. This rule was pronounced 
in Untermyer v. State Tax Commission, 129 P.2d 881 (1942), where 
it stated at page 885: 
The due process clause of the state constitution 
is substantially the same as the Fifth and Fourteenth 
amendments to the Federal Constitution. Decisions of 
the Supreme Court of the United States on the due 
process clauses of the Federal Constitution are "highly 
persuasive" as to the application of that clause of our 
state constitution. 
More recently, the Supreme Court of Utah restated its policy 
on this issue in Terra Utilities, Inc., v. Public Service 
Commission, 575 P.2d 1029 (1978) at page 1033: 
Since the due process clause of our state 
Constitution (Article I, Section 7) is substantially 
similar to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
federal Constitution, the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States on the federal due process 
clauses are highly persuasive as to the application of 
that clause of our state Constitution. 
The traditional goals of our system of jurisprudence, includ-
ing equal protection and predictability, are better served when 
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the federal and state courts interpret their similar constitution< 
provisions in the same manner. 
The equal protection and due process arguments that appellant 
raise were also raised in the Smith, Rubenstein, Kisley, and 
City of Indianapolis. As noted above, the United States Supreme 
Court has ruled that those arguments do not raise a substantial 
federal question. Unless the Supreme Court of Utah interprets 
its state constitution more liberally than the United States 
Supreme Court interprets the Federal Constitution, the appellants' 
arguments do not raise a substantial state question, and should 
likewise be summarily dismissed. 
B. SINCE THE PROHIBITION AGAINST MASSAGING MEMBERS OF THE 
OPPOSITE SEX APPLIES EQUALLY TO BOTH MEN AND WOMEN, 
THE ORDINANCE DOES NOT DISCRIMINATE WHATSOEVER BASED 
ON SEX. 
Part of the rationale upon which the courts have grounded 
their decisions that opposite-sex massage ordinances do not 
create a discriminating classification based on gender is that 
the treatment accorded the respective sexes is uniform. In the 
cases where discrimination has been found, the treatment accorded 
the respective sexes has differed significantly, and generally 
the treatment accorded the female was found to be inferior based 
upon historical and out-moded conceptions of the rights and 
duties of the respective sexes. The Supreme Court has condemned 
statutes based upon assumptions that men would generally be 
better estate administrators than women, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 
71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971); that women are the 
weaker sex and are more likely to be childrearers or dependents, 
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Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 97 S.Ct. 1192, 51 L.Ed.2d 360 
(1977); or that female spouses of servicemen would normally be 
dependent on their husbands while male spouses of servicewomen 
would not, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 
36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973). 
Opposite-sex massage ordinances, like the subject one, treat 
masseuses and masseurs equally. The ordinance does not use 
gender as a basis for imposing different legal rights and responsi-
bilities upon masseuses and masseurs. It does not assume that 
either sex is in greater need of protection. The Supreme Court 
of North Carolina adopted this reasoning in Smith v. Keator, 
supra, at page 210: 
Since the prohibition against massaging members of 
the opposite sex applies equally to both men and women, 
we fail to discern any discrimination whatsoever based 
on sex. Admittedly, if the ordinance provided that 
male massagists could massage female patrons but that 
females could not massage males, a different situation 
would be presented. However, this is not the case 
under the ordinance in question. 
The Supreme Court of Nevada found no violation of equal 
protection in a municipal ordinance proscribing opposite-sex 
wrestling for pleasure in the case of Oueilhe v. Lovell, supra, 
and stated at 1349: 
Women and men are treated equally. Neither can 
wrestle for sexual pleasure with a member of the opposite 
sex for pay. Thus, the ordinance is neutral on its 
face and does not carry with it a gender-based discrim-
inatory effect. Cf. Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. 
vs. Rizzo, 524 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1975), holding that an 
ordinance prohibiting intersex massage was not a denial 
of equal protection. 
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C. UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, GENDER-
BASED CLASSIFICATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION STANDARD OF BEING REASONABLY RELATED TO A 
LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST. 
Article IV of the Constitution of Utah is entitled "Election~ 
and Right of Suffrage." Section 1 of Article IV provides: 
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to 
vote and hold office shall not be denied or abridged on 
account of sex. Both male and female citizens of this 
State shall enjoy equally all civil, political and 
religious rights and privileges. 
Appellants contend that the foregoing provision is the operational 
equivalent of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the 
United States Constitution and thereby raises sex to a suspect 
classification under Utah law. Admittedly, the legislative 
intent of the sponsors of the ERA was to make sex a suspect 
classification. 
The courts of this state have never construed Article IV, 
Section 1 as a mandate to treat sex as a constitutionally suspect 
classification (see 90 A.L.R. 3d 158, 166 n.25}. In Salt Lake 
City v. Wilson, 46 U.60, 148 P.1104 (1915), the defendant claimed 
a city ordinance violated Article IV, Section 1 because it levied 
a road poll tax against men but exempted women. The court rejectec 
the defendant's position and held that our constitution permits 
reasonable classifications based upon gender. The court stated 
at page 1107: 
The defendant, however, further contends that our 
Constitution is broader with respect to the rights and 
privileges that are enjoyed by the sexes than are the 
provisions of the Constitutions of the several states 
whose decisions we have referred to, and hence it is 
contended those cases are not controlling here. As we 
have seen, our Constitution provides: 
"The rights of citizens of the stc;i.te of Utah to vote 
and to hold office shall not be denied or abridged on 
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account of sex. Both male and female citizens of this 
state shall enjoy equally all civil, political and 
religious rights and privileges." 
We confess our inability to see anything in the 
foregoing quotation which prevents a reasonable classi-
fication of the citizens of the state with regard to 
the performance of certain duties which may be required 
by the state under its police power. 
* * * Such a classification has, however, always been made 
and enforced from time immemorial, and, unless prohibited 
in express terms in the Constitution, it is a natural 
and proper one to make. We can discover nothing in the 
constitutional provision now under consideration which 
prohibits such a classification, and hence the contention 
cannot prevail. 
This court's position in Salt Lake City v. Wilson, Id., was 
reaffirmed in the Matter of the Estate of Baer, 562 P.2d 614 
(1977). There a party challenged the constitutionality of a Utah 
probate statute containing a gender-based classification favoring 
widows and not widowers. The court ruled that gender-based 
classifications were subject to the less stringent equal protection 
standard of being reasonably related to a legitimate state purpose. 
The court held at pages 615-6: 
The constitutional issue presented by respondents 
requires a determination whether the allowance of a 
distributive share only for widows is a discriminatory 
classification. Such a classification may be upheld if 
it bears a fair and substantial relation to a legitimate 
state purpose. 
* * The Utah statute serves a policy of long standing 
which cushions the financial impact of spousal loss 
upon the sex for which that loss imposes a dispropor-
tionately heavy burden. It is a legitimate state 
purpose to support widows who would have difficulty 
supporting themselves and therefore does not violate 
the equal protection clause. 
The decisions of this court unanimously support a 
presumption of constitutionality of legislative enactments. 
In determining constitutionality, statutes are presumed 
to be constitutional until the contrary is clearly 
shown. It is only when statutes manifestly infringe 
upon some constitutional provision that they can be 
declared void. Every reasonable presumption must be 
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indulged in and every reasonable doubt resolved in 
favor of constitutionality. 
Appellants rely upon Beehive Med. Electronics v. Industrial 
Commission, 583 P.2d 53 {1978) as authority for their assertion 
that Article IV, Section 1 mandates strict scrutiny for all 
gender-based classifications. The case they so heavily rely upon 
does not even deal with a statute that has a gender-based classi-
fication. In Beehive, the plaintiff was challenging the constitu-
tionality of the State Antidiscrimination Act alleging that it 
violated the due process and contract clauses of the state consti-
tution. The plaintiff did not allege that the Antidiscrimination 
Act offended Article IV, Section 1, but rather that Article IV, 
Section 1 and Article I, Section 18 may represent conflicting 
goals in some situations. In this regard the court commented at 
page 60: 
One other matter concerning constitutionality 
should be mentioned. If we assume, arguendo, that 
there is irreconcilability between two provisions of 
the Constitution of Utah, viz. , Art. IV, Sec. 1, ante, 
and Art. I, Sec. 18 which states: 
No . . . law impairing the obligations of 
contracts shall be passed. then Art. IV, Sec. 1 
must prevail as the more precious right in our basic law. 
Appellants argue that the court's reference to Article IV, 
Section 1 as a "more precious light" makes gender-based classifi-
cations constitutionally suspect; however, the court's comparative 
ranking of the rights guaranteed under those two sections does 
not constitute a categorization for equal protection scrutiny. 
Whether sex should be elevated to the category of constitu-
tionally suspect classifications is presently being determined 
through the traditional democratic process. Respondents urge 
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this court to permit this process to continue to a conclusion. 
To quote Mr. Justice Powell in his dissent in Frontiero v. 
Richardson, supra: 
There is another, and I find compelling, reason 
for deferring a general categorizing of sex classif ica-
tions as invoking the strictest test of judicial scrutiny. 
The Equal Rights Amendment, which if adopted will 
resolve the substance of this precise question, has 
been approved by the Congress and submitted for ratifi-
cation by the States.· If this Amendment is duly adopted, 
it will represent the will of the people accomplished 
in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. By 
acting prematurely and unnecessarily, as I view it, the 
Court [should not assume] a decisional responsibility 
at the very time when state legislatures, functioning 
within the traditional democratic process, are debating 
the proposed Amendment. It seems to me that this 
reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major 
political decision which is currently in process of 
resolution does not reflect appropriate respect for 
duly lrescribed legislative processes. [Emphasis 
added . 
D. THE ORDINANCE IS REASONABLY AND RATIONALLY RELATED TO 
ITS LEGITIMATE LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVE OF SUPPRESSING 
THE USE OF MASSAGE PARLORS FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES. 
In the absence of a showing by the appellants that the 
strict scrutiny-compelling state interest test is the appropriate 
test of gender-based classifications under Utah law, the proper 
standard of review is the reasonable relation test. Justice 
Wolfe defined this test in State v. Mason, 78 P.2d 920, 923 
(1938): 
Of course, every legislative act is in one sense 
discriminatory. The Legislature cannot legislate as to 
all person or all subject matters. It is inclusive as 
to some class or group and as to some human relationships, 
transactions, or functions and exclusive as to the 
remainder. For that reason, to be unconstitutional the 
discrimination must be unreasonable or arbitrary. A 
classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in 
its inclusion or exclusion features so long as there is 
some basis for the differentiation between classes or 
subject matters included as compared to those excluded 
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from its operation, provided the differentiation bears 
a reasonable relation to the purposes to be accomplished 
by the act. 
The court in Patterson v. City of Dallas, determined that 
the opposite-sex massage ordinance before it had a reasonable 
relationship to its legislative purpose. The court stated at 
pages 840-1: 
The question is directly presented: Does Section 
8-28 of the Code of Civil and Criminal Ordinances of 
the City of Dallas bear a reasonable and substantial 
relationship to the ends sought to be achieved by the 
legislating body, or does same arbitrarily establish a 
fixed Code of conduct which bears but a remote specula-
tive and conjectual relationship to any valid results 
sought to be achieved under the Police power? 
* * * From the undisputed testimony of Captain Gannaway, 
and considering the record as a whole it is apparent 
that the Police Department of the City of Dallas was 
confronted with a real problem in the operating of 
massage establishments because of lewd acts committed 
or arising from the massaging of a person of one sex by 
a person of 'another sex. In an effort to correct this 
evil the Police Department of the City of Dallas made 
investigations and collected facts which were presented 
to the attention of the City Council of the City of 
Dallas with the recommendation that the Ordinance in 
question be passed in an attempt to curb the evil which 
then existed. It is to be observed that the Section 
under attack prohibits a member of one sex from admin-
istering a massage to a person of the opposite sex, 
with the exception noted. It does not prohibit, but 
permits, a masseur to administer a massage to a member 
of the male sex, and a masseuse to administer a massage 
to a member of the female sex. The right to conduct a 
massage establishment, after complying with the Massage 
Ordinances and securing a permit, is not prohibited but 
is merely regulated. This record does not demonstrate 
failure on the part of the City Council to perform its 
legal functions. Appellants have failed to sustain 
their burden of proof to show that the Ordinance com-
plained of was enacted without reason or that it was 
enacted arbitrarily. 
The facts in the instant case, like those in Patterson v. 
City of Dallas, are undisputed. The minutes of the Board of 
County Commissioners' meeting of November 20, 1978, (see record 
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at pp.35-C and 35-D), contain the statements of Captain Morgan of 
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office and Assistant Salt Lake 
County Attorney Oberhansly and reflect the serious problems that 
law enforcement officials were faced with as a result of the lewd 
and immoral acts arising from the massaging of a person by a 
person of another sex. Each official recommended that the ordin-
ance in question be adopted in an effort to curb the problem that 
then existed in Salt Lake County. 
The reasonable relationship between the restrictions imposed 
by a similar ordinance and the end sought to be achieved was 
recognized by the court in Ex parte Maki, when it stated: 
The likelihood that licentiousness may result from 
the intimate contact of members of opposite sexes in 
the secrecy of the treatment chamber is a necessary 
factor in considering whether the ordinance is an 
intelligent and serious effort to regulate the occupa-
tion of maintaining a massage parlor~ [Id. at 69] 
* * * The barrier erected by the ordinance against 
immoral acts likely to result from too intimate familiar-
ity of the sexes is no more than a reasonable regulation 
imposed by the city council in the fair exercise of 
police powers. [Id. at 67] 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Smith v. 
Keator, supra, at 210 ruled: 
Furthermore, in light of the inherent character of the 
subject matter and the evil sought to be eliminated 
-namely, immoral acts likely to result from too intimate 
familiarity of the sexes - we hold the classification 
is reasonable and not arbitrary and has a fair and 
substantial relation to the object of the ordinance. 
Appellants have the burden of showing that the subject 
ordinance does not bear a reasonable relationship with the purpose 
to be accomplished by the ordinance. They have failed to sustain 
that burden of proof. 
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E. THE ORDINANCE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A BILL OF ATTAINDER 
UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 18 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH. 
Appellants allege, at page 29 of their brief, that the 
ordinance constitutes a bill of attainer and is therefore unconsti· 
tutional under Article 1, Section 18, Constitution of the State 
of Utah. In support of this claim they cite the case of 
Hart Health Studio v. Salt Lake County, 577 P.2d 116 (Utah 1978). 
In that case, the court held that a $5,000.00 license fee imposed 
upon massage parlors employing masseurs who worked at any massage 
parlor whose license had been revoked during the preceeding 12 
months created a class that was not reasonably related to a 
legitimate legislative objective and therefore violated equal 
protection guaranties. The court further likened the imposition 
of the large license fee to the old "bill of pains." The court 
wrote at page 118: 
The imposition of this $5,000 license fee is 
related neither to the violation of a county ordinance 
by the licensee, who must pay the fee, nor to a violation 
by the employee - masseur but instead is based on a 
violation of an ordinance by a former employer of the 
employee. This class of employees and employers is 
discriminated against and without reasonable relationship 
to eliminating immorality. 
We also believe this section of the ordinance is 
somewhat like the old bills of pains and penalties 
(special acts of a legislature which inflict punishment 
on persons without any conviction by the ordinary 
course of judicial proceedings), prohibited by the Utah 
and U.S. Constitutions. The ordinance clearly penalizes 
the masseur and his employer without a trial or convic-
tion, and thus is clearly invalid and unenforceable 
under the constitutional provisions cited. 
A bill of attainder, as defined by the United States Supreme 
Court in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 
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425, 53 L.Ed.2d 867, 97 S. Ct. 2777 (1977), is a law that legisla-
tively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifi-
able individual without provision of the protections of a judicial 
trial. In United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 14 L. Ed. 2d 484, 
85 S.Ct. 1707 (1965), the United States Supreme Court invalidated 
an act that made it a crime for a Communist Party member to serve 
as an officer of a labor union. The court ruled that the act 
worked a bill of attainder by focusing upon easily identifiable 
members of a class and imposing upon them the sanction of mandatory 
forfeiture of a job or office. 
When the subject ordinance is examined in light of Nixon and 
Brown, it is apparent that the requisite characteristics of a 
bill of attainder are not present. This ordinance applies to 
everyone, not just a selected group or class, it restricts all 
persons from massaging a member of the opposite sex. Therefore, 
it lacks the first requisite, that of being directed at a select 
group as opposed to the universe. 
Even if the ordinance were deemed sufficiently specific in 
the definition of the group it punished, it would not automatically 
be a bill of attainder. Rather, it must be determined that the 
ordinance's regulations inflict punishment within the constitutional 
proscription against bills of attainder. The court in Nixon, 
propounded a staged test for this purpose. First: does any 
feature of the challenged act fall within the historical meaning 
of "legislative punishment?" Second: does the challenged law, 
viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, 
further legislative purposes that are nonpunitive? Third: does 
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the legislative record indicate a legislative intent to punish? 
The historical meaning of "legislative punishment" commonly 
included imprisonment, banishment, punitive confiscation of 
property by the sovereign, and barring designated individuals or 
groups from specified vocations--a mode of punishment commonly 
employed against those legislatively determined to be disloyal. 
The subject ordinance does not bar designated individuals or 
groups from employment as masseurs, but regulates the sexual 
makeup of their clientele. 
Under the second test, it is apparent from the minutes of 
the hearing held before the Board of County Commissioners prior 
to the adoption of the subject ordinance that the ordinance 
served a non-punitive purpose. The testimony clearly indicates 
that the functional purpose was to decrease the incidents of 
immoral and indecent sex acts in massage parlors, a severe problem 
that existed in the community. There is no evidence to show that 
its functional purpose was to punish a specified group. 
The third test is motivational: did the Board of County 
Commissioners intend to punish the group or class identified in 
the ordinance? Here again, the record is devoid of any indication 
that the motivation for enacting the ordinance was punitive. 
The application of the tests set forth in Nixon, leads to 
rejection of appellants' argument that the ordinance constitutes 
a bill of attainder. 
Appellants' argument is far outside of traditional bill 
of attainder analysis. Usually, the individual or group that is 
the subject of legislative punishment is named in the statute, 
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and the punishment imposed on that group is also specified in the 
body of the statute. But appellants' claim that the group that 
the ordinance is directed at is the massage parlor owners and the 
punishment is that they will be driven out of business. Appellants 
are actually arguing that the ordinance will impose a burden upon 
them that is disproportionate and unfair. President Nixon made 
the same argument in Nixon and the court in rejecting his position 
stated: 
Appellant's characterization of the meaning of a 
bill of attainder obviously proves far too much. By 
arguing that an individual or defined group is attainted 
whenever he or it is compelled to bear burdens which 
the individual or group dislikes, appellant removes the 
anchor that ties the bill of attainder guarantee to 
realistic conceptions of classification and punishment. 
His view would cripple the very process of legislating, 
for any individual or group that is made the subject of 
adverse legislation can complain that the lawmakers 
could and should have defined the relevant affected 
class at a greater level of generality. Furthermore, 
every person or group made subject to legislation which 
he or it finds burdensome may subjectively feel, and 
can complain, that he or it is being subjected to 
unwarranted punishment. 
This court, in Hart Health Studio, determined that the 
ordinance then under examination levied a specific penal sanction 
(a $5,000.00 license fee) on a specific class (licensees employing 
masseurs who had worked at parlors that had their licenses revoked 
within the preceeding 12 months), and it therefore constituted a 
bill of attainder. The punishment that appellants' claim will be 
imposed upon them--being put out of business, is speculative and 
remote. Appellants' claim that the ordinance is a bill of attainder 
relies upon arguments outside the law and logic. 
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POINT III. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTIONS 17-5-27 AND 17-5-77 
AUTHORIZE THE ADOPTION OF THE OPPOSITE-SEX MASSAGE 
ORDINANCE. 
Appellants claim, at Point I-A of their brief, that Utah 
Code Annotated Section 17-5-27 does not authorize the County to 
enact an opposite-sex massage ordinance. Section 17-5-27 provides 
They may license for purpose of regulation and revenue 
all and every kind of business not prohibited by law 
and all shows, exhibitions and lawful games carried on 
in the county outside the limits of incorporated cities; 
they may fix the rates of license tax upon the same and 
provide for the collection thereof by suit or otherwise; 
they may license, tax, regulate, suppress and prohibit 
billiard, bagatelle, pigeonhole, or any other tables or 
implements kept or used for similar purposes, also pin 
alleys or tables, and ball alleys, dancing halls, 
dancing resorts, dancing pavilions and all places or 
reso_rts to which persons of opposite sexes may resort 
for the purpose of dancing or indulging in other social 
amusements; provided, that any person who is unable to 
obtain a livelihood by manual labor and who is deemed 
worthy may be given a privilege to hawk, peddle or vend 
goods, wares and merchandise not prohibited by law 
without payment of a license tax or fee therefor. The 
board of county commissioners may pass all ordinances 
and rules and make all regulations not repugnant to law 
necessary for carrying into effect all powers and 
duties conferred by this section, and to enforce obedience 
to such ordinances with such fines and imprisonments as 
the board may deem proper; provided, that the punishment 
for any offense shall be by fine in any sum less than 
$300 or by imprisonment not to exceed six months, or by 
both such fine and imprisonment. 
Appellants, without supporting evidence, speculate that the 
subject ordinance will put 95 per cent of existing massage parlors 
out of busines and that such a result amounts to prohibiting and 
suppressing and not merely regulating. 
The subject ordinance does not prohibit or suppress msssages 
or massage parlors. The ordinance does nothing to prevent a 
person who desires a massage from purchasing one. In the absence 
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of evidence to the contrary, it can be assumed that the demand 
for massages will remain relatively constant after the ordinance 
becomes effective. The entrepreneur operating a massage parlor 
will adapt to this governmental regulation and hire masseurs and 
masseuses in a ratio corresponding to his clientele. Massage 
parlors that have been relying on the sale of sexual favors will 
suffer financial losses and their business will be suppressed, 
but the commerce of selling massages will continue with regulation 
and without suppression or prohibition. 
The restrictions imposed by the ordinance are regulatory in 
nature and not prohibitory. See WORDS AND PHRASES, "Regulate", 
Vol. 36A, page 315. The court in Patterson v. City of Dallas, 
rejected the plaintiff's allegation that the opposite sex massage 
ordinance went beyond regulation and stated: 
It does not prohibit, but permits, a masseur to admin-
ister a massage to a member of the male sex, and a 
masseuse to administer a massage to a member of the 
female sex. The right to conduct a massage establish-
ment, after complying with the Massage Ordinances and 
securing a permit, is not prohibited but is merely 
regulated. [At page 841] 
The court in Ex parte Maki, adopted the same view: 
Since the ordinance in question does not prohibit 
either man or woman from engaging in the occupation of 
the masseur but merely regulates the conduct of a 
business in the interest of the state, there is no 
infraction of article XX of the Constitution. [At page 
67] 
In summary, the ordinance before the court will regulate 
massage parlors and will suppress the sale of sex acts in massage 
parlors. 
-23-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The appellants then argue, at Point 1-B of their brief, that 
the subject ordinance is not necessary nor proper and therefore 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 17-5-77 does not authorize the same. 
All regulatory ordinances authorized by Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 17-5-27 must be proper and necessary, this court so held 
in Butt v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 550 P.2d 202, at 203 
(Utah 1976): 
Very early in our State's history this court 
recognized that city councils and boards of commissioners 
have large discretion in regulating businesses. We 
held in Salt Lake City v. Revene that a statute empower-
ing a city to "regulate" a particular business authorizes 
the city to prescribe and enforce all such proper and 
reasonable rules and regulations as may be deemed 
necessary and wholesome in conducting the business in a 
proper and orderly manner. 
Section 17-5-77 is a codification of this rule; it provides: 
The board of county commissioners may pass all 
ordinances and rules and make all regulations, not 
repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or 
discharging the powers and duties conferred by this 
title, and such as are necessary and proper to provide 
for the safety, and preserve the health, promote the 
prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, 
comfort and convenience of the county and the inhabitants 
thereof, and for the protection of property therein; 
and may enforce obedience to such ordinances with such 
fines or penalties as the board may deem proper; pro-
vided, that the punishment of any offense shall be by 
fine in any sum less than $300 or by imprisonment not 
to exceed six months, or by both such fine and impri~ 
sonment. The board of county commissioners may pass 
ordinances to control air pollution. 
The necessity of the subject ordinance was determined by the 
County's legislative body, the Board of County Commissioners. 
After a public hearing, the minutes of which are part of this 
record (pages 35 A,B,C,D), the board made the legislative judgment 
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that the ordinance was a necessity. The court in Ex parte Maki 
made the following observation relative to legislativ~ judgment 
and the necessity of an opposite sex massage ordinance at page 
67: 
In testing the legislative judgment with respect 
to the necessity for the enactment of regulatory laws 
in the absence of a judicial determination to the 
contrary, the presumption is that the city council's 
action was supported by known facts requiring the 
enactment. Such presumption demands but little appli-
cation here. The inclination of a percentage of mankind 
to ignore conventionalities, moral codes and inhibitory 
statutes and to indulge in licentious practices arising 
from the sex impulse is too well known to the student 
of history and sociology to require extended discussion. 
In support of their contention that the ordinance was enacted 
without supporting statutory authority, the appellants claim that 
the ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police 
power and therefore not authorized by Section 17-5-77. They cite 
Jensen v. Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners, 530 P.2d 3 
(Utah 1974) as authority for their notion. In Jensen, the County 
had enacted an ordinance setting certain qualifications for 
operators and employees of massage parlors. The plaintiffs applied 
for business licenses and were denied the same because they 
failed to demonstrate that they met the qualifications set by the 
ordinance which required: 
(5} A certificate showing that: 
(a) the applicant has practiced as a massage 
therapist for a period of at least five (5} years prior 
to the date of this amendment to the Massage Parlor 
Regulations; or (b) That the applicant is a graduate of 
a massage and therapy school approved by the American 
Massage and Therapy Association; or (c) is a fully 
accredited member, in good standing, of the American 
Massage and Therapy Association. Id. at 4. 
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The trial court struck down the ordinance because of vagueness 
and the Supreme Court concurred and held: 
The trial court was of the opinion that the language 
of the ordinance was so vague and uncertain as to 
render it invalid. We conclude that that determination 
by the trial court was correct. A person who might 
wish to enter the field covered by the ordinance would 
be unable to determine from its wording what qualifica-
tion or skill would be necessary to qualify for a 
license. It is noted that the ordinance uses the term 
"massage therapist" but nowhere is that term defined. 
The regulation of physical therapists is under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Business Regulation 
of the State of Utah pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 58-1-5(12) and would not be subject to regula-
tion by the County. It cannot be determined from the 
language of the amendment under consideration whether 
or not the terms "massage therapist" and "physical 
therapist" are synonymous. The other qualifications 
mentioned in the amendment require compliance with 
rules and standards of private associations which are 
not spelled out in the amendment, nor is there any 
indication as to where those standards might be found. 
Id at 4. . 
The Court in Jensen, Id. at 4, then added the language upon 
which the appellants rely: 
At the trial in the court below a county 
commissioner and a member of the county sheriff's 
office testified that prostitution was the major con-
cern in the adoption of the ordinance in question. It 
is the County's contention that it is a valid exercise 
of police power to regulate massage establishments and 
to control prostitution. We are of the opinion that 
the County does have the power to deal with those 
matters directly. However, the ordinance under consid-
eration does neither, but rather it attempts to set 
standards and qualifications of those persons who 
intend to engage in a legitimate occupation or trade. 
This is not a proper exerise of the police power. 
The subject ordinance does not attempt to set standards or 
qualifications for occupations. It prevents the continuation of 
the licentiousness that breeds in massage parlors by eliminating 
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intimate contact between members of the opposite sex in the 
secrecy of the treatment chambers. The relationship between the 
standards imposed by the ordinance in Jensen, and its goal of 
suppressing prostitution was too remote and the Court struck it 
down. However, the regulations imposed by the opposite-sex 
massage ordinance have a direct relationship to the goal to be 
achieved. 
POINT IV. THE STATE HAS NOT PREEMPTED THE FIELD OF SEXUAL 
OFFENSES AND THIS ORDINANCE IS NOT IN CONFLICT 
WITH STATE LAW. 
The appellants urge this court to adopt the rule set down by 
the Supreme Court of California in Lancaster v. Municipal Court 
for Beverly Hills, 494 P.2d 681 (1972) wherein the landmark case 
in the area of opposite-sex massages, Ex parte Maki, was partially 
overruled. The court in Lancaster determined that the criminal 
aspects of sexual activity had been preempted by the state legis-
lature and any local municipal ordinance is invalid if it attempts 
to pose additional requirements in that area of the law. The 
court held at page 684: 
We conclude that the Los Angeles ordinance which 
is a regulation of sexual conduct must be held invalid 
because the state has preempted the criminal aspects of 
sexual activity. 
The preemption rule set forth in Lancaster is based on the 
California rule that the state has exclusive jurisdiction of 
criminal aspects of sexual activity, the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah has taken an opposite position that makes the 
adoption of the Lancaster preemption argument inconsistent with 
existing law. 
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The leading case in the State of Utah in the area of pre-
emption is Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 93 P.2d 671 (1938), wherein 
Justice Wolfe set down the rule that a local municipal ordinance 
is not in conflict with a similar state criminal statute unless 
(1) the local ordinance permits activities prohibited by the 
state law, or (2} the local ordinance is inconsistent with the 
state law. The court stated at page 673: 
The city does not attempt to authorize by this ordinance 
what the Legislature has forbidden; nor does it forbid 
what the Legislature has expressly licensed, authorized, 
or required. 
* * * 
Unless legislative provisions are contradictory in the 
sense that they cannot coexist, they are not to be 
deemed inconsistent because of the mere lack of unifor-
mity and detail. 
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court of Utah, in the case 
of Salt Lake City v. Allred, 437 P.2d 434 (1968), had before it 
an argument similar to the one that is now urged upon the court 
by the a pp el lan ts and set forth in Lancaster. Salt Lake City had 
adopted an ordinance prohibiting aiding or abetting the directing 
of any person to any place for purposes of committing and act of 
sexual intercourse for hire and the court upheld the ordinance 
and stated at page 437: 
In summary we conclude that the state has not preempted 
the field of sexual offenses since the ordinance in 
question is a proper exercise of police power, and the 
ordinance is not inconsistent with the state statutes 
pertaining to sexual offenses. 
Thus, the rule in Utah is directly contrary to the rule in 
California set forth in Lancaster. As to whether or not the 
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passing of ordinances by municipalities, for the purpose of 
defeating the business of prostitution is a proper exercise of 
police power the court in Allred stated at page 436: 
There is nothing in the state statutes regulating 
sexual offenses that evidences any express or implied 
intent to preclude local governments from also attempt-
ing to prohibit and suppress the difficult problem of 
the sex offender. Therefore, it is our opinion that 
the city is not precluded in enacting the ordinance in 
question unless it is inconsistent or in conflict with 
the state statutes dealing with sex offenses. 
It is a well-established principle in this state that 
the city has the right to legislate on the same subject 
as the state statute where either the general police 
power or express granted authorities conferred upon 
municipalities. (citations omitted) 
However, the defendant contends in the case before us 
that the ordinance in question is inconsistent and in 
conflict with the state laws and, therefore, invalid on 
the grounds that the ordinance attempts to make crimes 
of acts which are not crimes under the state laws. 
Assuming this to be true, a careful examination of the 
city ordinance (citation omitted) and the material 
sections of the state laws pertaining to sexual offenses, 
(citations omitted) reveals that both the city ordinance 
and the state statutes have the common purpose of 
defeating the practice of business of prostitution or 
the vice of sexual intercourse for hire and are closely 
related in subject matter. The mere fact that an act 
denounced as a crime under the ordinance which is not 
denounced as a crime under the statute would not neces-
sarily render the act under the ordinance inconsistent 
with the statute whereas here the ordinance is within 
the scope of the state law dealing with the same related 
subject of sexual offenses and is in no way repugnant 
to, but on the other hand is in harmony with the state 
laws. We believe the ordinance is consistent with the 
statute pertaining to sex offenses. 
The enabling statute under which Salt Lake City enacted its 
anti-prostitution ordinance that was the subject of the Allred 
case is found at Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-8-84, 1953, as 
amended, and is, in all pertinent parts, identical to Utah Code 
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Annotated, Section 17-5-77, 1953 as amended, supra, under which 
Salt Lake County enacted the subject ordinance. 
The court in Allred further stated that the language containe 
in the enabling statute was sufficient to sustain the ordinance 
directed at prostitution and stated at page 435: 
Also in accordance with the power contained in Section 
10-8-84, U.C.A. 1953, the Utah Supreme Court, in Ogden 
City v. Leo, 54 Utah 556, 182 P. 530, 5 A.L.R. 960, 
upheld as reasonable and valid a city ordinance prohibit-
ing the maintenance of booths of certain dimensions in 
restaurants so as to prevent persons of both sexes 
having no regard for law or morals meeting in such 
places. If the prohibition involved in the Leo case 
had a reasonable relationship to the preservation of 
the public morals, the prohibition of an act of sexual 
intercourse for hire under the city ordinance in this 
case would also appear to bear a reasonable relationship 
to the preservation and protection of public morals. 
The protection of public morals has always been a 
matter of .local concern which requires regulation by 
municipalities, and properly falls within the scope of 
the police power. 
The supre~e court in State • v. Salt Lake City, 21 U.2d 318, 
445 P.2d 691 (1968), had before it a comprehensive ordinance that 
purported to license nonprofit clubs. The plaintiffs sued Salt 
Lake City alleging that the area of licensing private clubs was 
preempted by the State. The court determined that the area was 
preempted by the State and the City's ordinance was struck down, 
but in doing so, the court made an important distinction between 
municipal ordinances that impose additional requirements above 
and beyond those required by the State legislature and those 
municipal ordinances that prohibit citizens from doing some act, 
such as is the case with the ordinance in question. The court 
stated at page 694: 
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There is a relevant distinction which should be observed: 
where the legislature imposes the requirement of doing 
some affirmative action, such as obtaining a license or 
a charter, upon a citizen, it may be implied that the 
legislature intended that the cities and counties shall 
not require him to do more. In contrast, where the 
legislature prohibits the citizens from doing some act, 
there is no basis to imply that the legislature intended 
that cities and counties should not have additional 
prohibitions. This concept is in accordance with 
Salt Lake City v. Kusse, where this court in commenting 
on various tests to determine whether there is a conflict 
between the statute and the ordinance, quoted with 
approval the following: 
* * * 
"··.the city does not attempt to authorize by 
this ordinance what the legislature has 
forbidden; nor does it forbid what the legis-
lature has expressly licensed, authorized, or 
required." 
In Allgood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 530 (Utah 1976) and Layton 
City v. Speth, 578 P.2d 828 (Utah· 1978), the Supreme Court of 
Utah held that municipal ordinances may not set a criminal punish-
ment that varies from the punishment imposed under state law for 
the same culpable behavior. The subject ordinance does not 
impose a criminal sanction that varies in magnitude with the 
state statutes and therefore Allgood and Layton City do not 
control. 
The precedential value of the language in Allgood and Layton 
City is further diminished by the fact that a majority of the 
court did not join in the majority opinion in either case. 
If this court finds the subject ordinance invalid because it 
is in conflict with the state criminal law, respondents urge this 
court to strike only that section of the ordinance that offends 
the state criminal law, namely, Section 15-18-8, and leave in 
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place the respondents' ability to revoke a business license for 
violation of the ordinance. 
In City of Indianapolis v. Wright, the opposite-sex massage 
ordinance did not provide for criminal sanctions and therefore it 
was not preempted by general state law. The court held at page 
1300: 
The massage parlors contend that the city-county ordinance 
prohibits the same acts as are prohibited by the above 
state statutes and that the ordinance is therefore 
invalid. We have, however, already determined that the 
ordinance does not provide for misdemeanor penalities 
and there is no state statute which establishes a 
licensing system for massage parlors. Lancaster v. 
Municipal Court, (1972) 6 Cal.3d 805, 100 Cal.Rptr.609, 
494 P.2d 681, is distinguishable in that the ordinance 
involved in that case provided for misdemeanor penalties. 
Under the facts of this case we do not believe that the 
present massage parlor ordinance involves the same 
''subject matter" as the state statutes. City of 
Indianapolis v. Sablica, (1976) Ind., 342 N.E.2d 853~ 
855. The ordinance establishes a licensing plan whereas 
the statutes establish a penal scheme. The ordinance 
is therefore not unconstitutional under Ind. Const. 
Art. 4 §§ 22 and 23 as being an attempted local law 
where the legislature has determined that a general law 
shall apply. 
If Salt Lake City v. Kusse and Salt Lake City v. Allred 
still correctly represent the law in the State of Utah, the 
ordinance here in question does not violate general state law. 
If the ordinance is deemed invalid because it contradicts, or is 
preempted by, state criminal law, the section providing for penal 
sanctions should be severed in accordance with Section 15-18-9 of 
the ordinance, which provides: "In the event that any provision 
of this ordinance is declared invalid for any reason, the remaini~ 
sections shall remain in effect." 
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POINT V. THE SUBJECT ORDINANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE UTAH 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT NOR UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
SECTION 13-7-3. 
Appellants complain in their brief (though not in their 
complaint} that the ordinance requires massage parlor operators 
to violate Utah's Antidiscrimination Act because as a practical 
matter, operators will hire employees based upon the sex ratio of 
the clientele and not solely upon the ability of the employee. 
The statute appellants claim is offended is Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 34-35-6(l)(a); it provides: 
It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment 
practice: 
For an employer to refuse to hire, to discharge, 
to promote, demote, or terminate, or to discriminate in 
matters of compensation against any person otherwise 
qualified, because of race, color, sex, age, if the 
individual is 40 years of age or older, religion, 
ancestry, national origin, or handicap. 
The term "employer," as used in the foregoing section, is 
defined at Utah Code Annotated, Section 34-35-2(5): 
"Employer" means the state or any political 
subdivision or board, commission, department, institu-
tion or school district thereof, and every other person 
employing 25 or more employees within the state; but it 
does not include religions organizations or associations, 
religious corporations sole, nor any corporation or 
association constituting a wholly owned subsidiary or 
agency of any religious organization or association or 
religious corporation sole, a bona fide private member-
ship club (other than a labor organization). 
The appellants do not have standing to challenge the ordinance 
upon the grounds it violates Section 34-35-6(l)(a). There is no 
evidence before this court that any of the appellants employ 25 
or more employees, therefore they are not employers as the the 
term is defined in the Code. 
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The Supreme Court of Utah has not, previous to the instant 
case, had the opportunity of deciding if an opposite-sex massage 
ordinance violates Section 34-35-6(l)(a); however, the federal 
government has very similar legislation in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the federal courts have ruled on this 
issue. The corresponding legislation provides in part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's race,. color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(l). 
The term "employer means a person engaged in an 
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more 
employees for each working day in each of twenty or 
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar 
year, and any agent of such a person, but such term 
does not include (1) the United States, a corporation 
wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an 
Indian tribe .... 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b). 
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, in 
Hogge v. Johnson, and the Third Circuit in Colorado Springs 
Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, ruled that in the absence of evidence 
showing plaintiffs (massage parlors) met the definition of "employE 
there was no violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The 
court in Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd., supra, decided at 
page 576-7: 
The owners' argument is that compliance with section 
9-610(4) of the ordinance would force them to breach 
section 703(a)(l) and section 703(a)(2) of the Act, 
which respectively prohibit.r~fusal to hire.and depriva-
tion of employment opportunities on the ~asis.of sex. 
That claim must fail, however, at least in this case. 
This is so because section 703(a) of the Civil Rights 
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Act applies only to employment practices by an "employer," 
and section 70l(b) defines an employer as "a person ... 
who has fifteen or more employees .... '' It is neither 
alleged nor in any way suggested that any of the owners 
employ this number of persons. There is thus no viola-
tion of the Civil Rights Act. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, a year after its opinion 
in Hogge v. Johnson, was handed down, decided the case of Aldred 
v. Duling, 538 F.2d 637 (1976), where the massage parlor owner 
was an "employer" as defined in the law and, in a per curium 
decision, the court found that opposite sex massage ordinances do 
not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court 
stated at pages 637-8: 
The plaintiffs contend that the ordinance conflicts 
with the sex discrimination provisions of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically 42 U.S.C. 
§2000e et seq. After receiving evidence and hearing 
arguments, the district court dismissed the complaint 
as presenting no substantial federal question. 
We affirm. 
Bo-Jae, Ltd. owns and operates massage parlors in 
Virginia and North Carolina. It has employed fifteen 
or more employees for twenty or more calendar weeks and 
has also purchased materials and supplies that were 
shipped in interstate commerce. Thus, it is clear that 
Bo-Jae is an "employer" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 
§2000e. 
* * * 
The restrictions imposed by the Richmond ordinance 
apply equally to males and females; neither can perform 
massages on customers who are members of the opposite 
sex. Until then, Bo-Jae's all-male clientele had 
requested masseuses exclusively. The ordinance simply 
prohibits such a practice. It does not, as a legal 
matter, require Bo-Jae to hire or fire anyone; nor on 
its face, does it restrict the gender of the customers 
that Miss Masseuse may serve. As a practical matter, 
the ordinance made unlawful the only business Bo-Jae 
had conducted, the business of supplying masseuses to 
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service male customers, but, surely, Title VII cannot 
be read to foreclose the enactment of ordinances which 
have the effect of making unlawful conduct which may 
not have been unlawful when Title VII was enacted. 
Aldred was not discharged because of her sex; her 
employment was terminated because her employer went out 
of business. It had no work to be done which Aldred 
could lawfully perform. 
We hold that the ordinance is not in conflict with 
Title VII of the Act. 
Applying the rationale of Aldred v. Duling, Id. , to the 
instant case, the ordinance does not require the appellants to 
hire or fire anyone and therefore it does not violate Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 34-35-6(l)(a). This reasoning is consistent 
with the general purpose of Title VII as expressed in 12 ALR FED 
31, §4, "Employment--Sex Discrimination," which is, to eliminate 
disparate treatment of female employees and to place women on an 
equal footing with men with respect to their employment. The 
subject ordinance treats men and women equally; neither has an 
employment advantage because of its respective sex. 
Therefore, even if appellants had raised this issue in their 
complaint, and even if they were employers as defined in the law, 
their attack must still fail on its merits. 
Furthermore, for the purposes of this analysis, the ordinance 
has the benefit of a presumption that it is constitutional. 
Assuming the ordinance to be constitutional, it would follow that 
sex may be a bona fide occupational qualification and therefore 
exempt from the Utah Antidiscrimination Act under Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 34-35-6(2)(a). 
The Utah civil rights statutes (Utah Code Annotated Section 
13-7-1 et seq.) prohibit discrimination in public businesses on 
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the basis of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry, or national 
origin. Appellants argue that the subject ordinance will require 
them to violate the civil rights statutes if they only employ 
female massagists because they will have to deny service to men. 
Even if the civil rights statutes prohibit businesses from separat-
ing the sexes where customers typically disrobe (an assumption 
respondents do not accept), the subject ordinance is not rendered 
invalid by the civil rights statutes; it merely requires massage 
parlors to have the personnel necessary to provide service to 
both sexes. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 13-7-1 declares that discrimina-
tion in public businesses violates the public policy of this 
state. A regulation that separates the sexes where the partici-
pants undress, e.g., rest rooms, dressing rooms, and massage 
parlors, does not run contrary to the public policy of eliminating 
discrimination. 
The appellants, in support of their theory cite the case of 
Cianciolo v. Members of the City Councils, 376 F.Supp. 719 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1974). This case has been overruled, see footnote number 
1, City of Indianapolis v. Wright, supra at page 1301. 
POINT VI. THE ORDINANCE IS NOT VAGUE. APPELLANTS LACK THE 
STANDING TO CHALLENGE SECTIONS 15-18-1(2) AND 
15-18-4 OF THE ORDINANCE, ON GROUNDS OF VAGUENESS. 
Appellants contend that Sections 15-18-1(2) and 15-18-4 of 
the ordinance are unconstitutional because they are vague and 
uncertain. They challenge 15-18-1(2) on the basis that the phrase 
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"healing art" is used in the section but is not defined therein. 
Section 15-18-1(2) provides: 
"Masseur" shall mean any person who gives 
massages for hire; provided that any person who is duly 
licensed by the Department of Registration to practice 
the healing arts shall not be included within this 
definition. 
This definitional provision exempts from the regulations of 
the ordinance all persons who are licensed by the Department of 
Registration in any of the healing arts. The Department of 
Registration is established by Utah Code Annotated, Section 
58-1-1 and the Department is charged with the responsibility of 
regulating the professions named in subsequent chapters of Title 
58. The list of professions include barbers, podiatrists, dentist 
dental hygienists, embalmers, cosmetologists, nurses, optometrists 
pharmacists, plumbers, sanitarians, engineers, contractors, 
psychologists, accountants, veterinarians, irrigation fitters, 
landscape architects, social workers, electricians, electronic 
repair dealers, recreational therapists, speech pathologists, 
occupational therapists, water condition installers, midwives, 
security dealers, and hearing aid dealers. 
The fact that the Board of County Commissioners could have 
been more specific in its wording does not render the ordinance 
unconstitutional, see Wagner v. Salt Lake City, 504 P.2d 1007 
(Utah 1972). The ordinance is capable of sensible interpretation. 
The phrase "healing art" has the commonly accepted definition of 
being the skill of relieving and curing human ills, see WORDS AND 
PHRASES, "Healing Art," Permanent Edition, Vol. 19. By applying 
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the common usage definition of tthealing art" to the professions 
licensed by the Department of Registration, a reasonable applica-
tion can be made. This court has ruled: 
Concerning the charge that the statute is void for 
vagueness: the presumption of validity hereinabove 
stated, gives rise to the rule that a statute will not 
be declared unconstitutional for that reason if under 
any sensible interpretation of its language it can be 
given practical effect. The requirement is that it 
must be sufficiently clear and definite to inform 
persons of ordinary intelligence what their conduct 
must be to conform to its requirements and to advise 
one accused of violating it what constitutes the offense 
with which he is charged. Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 
805' 807 (1974). 
The ordinance is not substantially uncertain and whatever 
uncertainty may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis. 
We may speculate that an individual, licensed by the Department 
of Registration as one of the professionals provided for in Title 
58, may assert that the profession for which he is licensed is a 
healing art and therefore exempt from County regulation under the 
subject ordinance. If the County disagreed and asserted that his 
profession was not a healing art, the individual would have 
standing to seek judicial relief. 
In the present case, the appellants do not have standing to 
challenge Section 15-18-1(2) and Section 15-18-4, the latter of 
which provides: 
All applications for a massage establishment license 
shall be referred to the Salt Lake City-County Board of 
Health for investigation and a license shall be granted 
only after a finding by the Salt Lake City-County Board 
of Health that the proposed premises are sanitary 
enough to conduct business therein without jeopardizing 
the public health. 
-39-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
With the exception of Section 15-18-5(1) (opposite sex 
provision) and Section 15-18-5(2) (regulation of alcoholic bever-
ages on licensed premises), all provisions of the ordinance have 
been in effect since December 14, 1978. During this period of 
time, there hasn't been one case where a person claimed he was 
licensed by the Department of Registration and thereby exempt 
under Section 15-18-1(2) (healing arts provision), nor has a 
massage ,establishment's license been revoked or denied under 
authority of Section 15-18-4 (sanitary premises provision). 
Appellants speculate someone may, in the future, be harmed. 
Certainly there isn't any evidence in this record to indicate 
that the appellants are licensed in any profession by the Depart-
ment of Registration, let alone one of the healing arts and 
therefore cannot claim that they have suffered or shall suffer 
harm due to Section 15-18-1(2). Nor is there any evidence that 
any of the appellants has suffered by reason of the sanitary 
standard of Section 15-18-4, " ... premises are sanitary enough to 
conduct business therein without jeopardizing the public health." 
This court requires that parties possess the concrete adverse· 
ness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which it 
largely depends for illumination of difficult questions. The cour1 
so held in Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (1979) at pages 351-2: 
The constitutionality of a statute is to be con-
sidered in the light of the standing of the party who 
seeks to raise the question and of its particular 
application; and a person may challenge the constitu-
tionality of a statute only w~en and ~s f~r as it is 
being, or is about to be applied to his disadvantage. 
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This Court in State v. Kallas, expressed the rule 
on the matter as follows: 
This Court is committed to the rule 
that an attack on the validity of a statute 
cannot be made by parties whose interests 
have not been, and are not about to be, 
prejudiced by the operation of the statute. 
And in Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367 (1978) at 369 this court 
wrote: 
In regard to plaintiff's contention, these things 
are to be said generally about the interpretation 
and application of a statute or ordinance: it is 
not our duty to indulge in conjecture that the 
statute may be so distorted or unreasonably applied 
that some innocent person might come within its 
terms. Rather, it is our duty to assume that 
those who administer a statute will do so with 
reason and common sense, in accordance with its 
language and intent; and further, that if there is 
- a choice as to the matter of its interpretation 
and application, that should be done in a manner 
which will make it constitutional, as opposed to 
one which would make it invalid. 
Appellants' assertion that Section 15-18-1(4) of the ordinance 
is uncertain, because of the definition of "employee" is at 
variance with its definition in common usage, is without merit. 
If appellants' position were valid, nearly every statute contain-
ing definitions would be unconstitutional. The term "employee" 
is defined at Section 15-18-1(4) and it states: 
"Employee" means the operator, owner, or manager of a 
massage establishment and any person performing massages 
at or on the licensed premises of a massage establish-
ment and also any agent or independent contractor who 
gives massages at a massage establishment. 
The term "employee" is used twice in the body of the ordinance, 
once in Section 15-18-5(1) and again in Section 15-18-7. The 
application of the term is consistent with its definition. 
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When a court reviews an ordinance to ascertain its constitu-
tionality, certain rules of construction apply. Those rules are 
described in Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975), 
certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 1514, 425 U.S. 915, 47 L.Ed.2d 766 
(1975), and apply equally to the present examination: 
In reviewing an ordinance or statute to ascertain 
its constitutionality, certain rules of construction 
must be applied: 
(a) A legislative enactment is presumed to be 
valid and in conformity with the constitution. 
(b) It should not be held to be invalid unless it 
is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be incompatible 
with some particular constitutional provision. 
(c) The burden of showing invalidity of an ordi-
nance or statute is upon the one who makes the challenge. 
In the case of State v. Packard it was said: 
It is recognized that statutes should 
not be declared unconstitutional if there is 
any reasonable basis upon which they may be 
sustained as falling within the constitutional 
framework (citations omitted), and that a 
statute will not be held void for uncertainty 
if any sort of sensible, practical effect may 
be given it. (Citations omitted.) 
POINT VII. THE REQUIREMENT THAT ALL LICENSEES UNDER THE 
ORDINANCE BE AT LEAST 21 YEARS OF AGE IS RATIO-
NALLY RELATED TO THE LEGITIMATE LEGISLATIVE 
CONCERN OF SUPPRESSING ILLICIT SEXUAL ACTIVITIES 
IN MASSAGE PARLORS. 
Prior to adopting the ordinance, the Board of County Commis-
sioners held a hearing for the purpose of receiving public comment 
on the draft ordinance. They heard from the attorneys representinl 
the massage parlor owners and from representatives of the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's Office. Based upon the comments, the Board 
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determined that the health, safety, and welfare of the community 
required a regulation requiring massage parlor licensees and 
masseurs to be at least 21 years of age. Section 15-18-3(1) of 
the ordinance requires all licensees to be at least 21 years of 
age. 
This court ruled that age was not a constitutionally suspect 
classification in Purdie v. University of Utah, supra, and that 
classifications based on age need only be rational related to a 
legitimate state interest. This court held at page 833: 
Plaintiff has also urged us to declare that age is an 
inherently suspect classification and that post-graduate 
education at a university is a fundamental right, 
requiring application of the strict scrutiny test. We 
decline to do so, as the authorities cited are unper-
suasive, but base our reasons and opinion on the rational 
relationship test, noted ante. 
At the public hearing, Captain Morgan testified that massage 
parlors are often fronts for the sale of illicit sexual activities 
and that it was common to see teenage girls who worked in the 
massage parlors arrested for such crimes (record, pp. 35C and 
35D). It is apparent that the purpose of the ordinance, including 
this section, was to suppress the incidence of illicit and immoral 
sexual activities in massage parlors in the unincorporated area 
of Salt Lake County. Such a purpose constitutes a legitimate 
state interest for the purpose of equal protection analysis. By 
reasoning that young massagists would be susceptible to sexual 
exploitation because of their lack of maturity, and that there is 
some relationship between age and the maturity, the Board acted 
in a reasonable manner to further a legitimate state purpose . 
... 43_ 
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For an annotation reviewing cases determining the validity 
of a minimum age requirement for public office, see 90 A.L.R.3d 
900. 
There is legislative precedent for imposing the requirement 
that licensees for certain occupations must be at least 21 years 
of age, see Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-2-1, et seq., where 
it is required that physical therapists, embalmers, landscape 
architects, sanitarians, and many others be 21 years of age. 
Similarly, the state has not entrusted the privilege of consuming 
alcoholic beverages to individuals under 21 years of age. 
POINT VIII. SECTION 15-18-5(2) OF THE ORDINANCE IS NOT PREEMPTED 
BY STATE LIQUOR LAWS. 
Section 15-18--5(2) of the Ordinance provides: 
It shall be unlawful to serve, to store, or allow 
to be served, or allow to be consumed, any alcoholic 
beverages on the licensed premises of a massage estab-
lishment. 
Appellants cite the case of Salt Lake County v. Liquor Contro: 
Commission, 357 P.2d 488 (1960), as authority for the proposition 
that the ordinance is invalid because it attempts to regulate 
areas preempted by state law; however, after that case was decided 
the legislature enacted new laws in the area of liquor sales. 
The new legislation countermands the rule pronounced in Salt Lake 
County v. Liquor Control Commission, Id. This fact was acknowledgej 
by the court in a later decision in Rogue v. Utah Liquor 
Control Commission, 500 P.2d 509 (1972), where it stated at page 
510: 
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The argument derives from the case of Salt Lake County 
v. Liquor Control Commission, and the action of the 
State Legislature subsequent thereto. That case involved 
a dispute over the authority of the Liquor Commission 
to locate a liquor store in violation of a county 
zoning ordinance. It was held that the state statute, 
Sec. 32-1-6, U.C.A. 1953, having given the Commission 
plenary power to decide the number and location of 
liquor stores, took precedence over county zoning 
ordinances. Subsequent to that decision the Legislature 
saw fit to eliminate the conflict by amending that 
section, 32-l-6(b), by adding the provision: "that a 
state store or package agency shall not be located in 
violation of any valid zoning ordinance of any city, 
town or county .... " 
The intent of the legislature in enacting the new laws was 
to grant to the local authorities the power to control the siting 
of liquor outlets in their communities. Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 32-1-36.15 provides in part: 
Before establishing any state store or package agency, 
the commission shall: 
(a) Consult with the local governing authority of 
the locality where the store is to be operated; 
(b) Comply with all existing zoning ordinances of 
the locality where the store is to be operated; 
The State has relinquished its preemptive rights in this 
area of the law. Therefore, there is no conflict between the 
ordinance and the state's liquor laws. 
POINT IX. THE ORDINANCE DOES NOT CREATE INCHOATE CRIMES IN 
VIOLATION OF GENERAL STATE CRIMINAL LAW. 
At Point VIII of their brief, the appellants contend that 
the ordinance is invalid and contrary to "general state criminal 
laws" because it makes the licensee responsible for the unlawful 
conduct of his employees, which he permits, upon the premises. 
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Citing as authority for the "general state criminal law" that 
invalidates the ordinance, the appellants quote from Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 76-4-201. It provides: 
For purposes of this part a person is guilty of 
conspiracy when he, intending that conduct constituting 
a crime be performed, agrees with one or more persons 
to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct 
and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance 
of the conspiracy, except where the offense is a capital 
offense, a felony against the person, arson, burglary, 
or robbery, the overt act is not required for the 
commission of conspiracy. 
By its own words, this provision is limited in its applica-
tion and scope to Part 2 of Chapter 4 of the Criminal Code. The 
section begins with its limit~ng language, "For purposes of this 
part .... " There is nothing in this section that preempts a 
county from enacting an ordinance that makes a licensee responsible 
for the criminal acts he permits his employees to engage in on 
the licensed premises. Appellants do not cite any authority in 
support of their notion. 
It is proper for a municipality to enact an ordinance that 
places an affirmative responsibility upon licensees to see that 
their businesses are not conducted by their employees in violation 
of the law. 
The legislature has enac.ted statutes making it unlawful for 
a person to "permit" certain conduct on the person's premises, 
see Utah Code Annotated, Sections 32-7-24 (permitting drunkenness) 
and 32-4-19 (permitting consumption of beer). It must he assumed, 
in light of the fact the legislature has, itself, enacted laws 
rendering an individual culpable for permitting others to engage 
-46-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in proscribed conduct on specified premises, that Utah Code 
Annotated 76-4-201 does not invalidate all such laws as appellants 
suggest. 
The ordinance is not in conflict with the cited conspiracy 
section. A person may unlawfully permit another to perform a 
proscribed act without conspiring with another to commit a pro-
scribed act. 
Similar laws have sustained criminal convictions, see Brodsky 
v. California State Board of Pharmacy, 344 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1959) 
and Clown's Den, Inc. v. Canjar, 518 P.2d 957 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1973). 
The subject ordinance does not create inchoate offenses in 
violation of general state criminal law. 
CONCLUSION 
Several jurisdictions have already ruled on the constitution-
ality of opposite-sex massage ordinances and nearly ,all have 
found them to be constitutional and a valid exercise of police 
power. The constitutionality of such ordinances is so well 
established that the Supreme Court of Minnesota recently refused 
to grant massage parlor owners a preliminary injunction while the 
constitutionality of Rochester City's opposite-sex massage ordin-
ance was being litigated, because they were unable, in light of 
recent decisions, to show a ''likelihood of success on the merits." 
Hvamstad v. City of Rochester, 276 N.W.2d 633, 634 (Minn. 1979). 
A critical examination of the points raised by the appellants 
fails to disclose a single reason why this court should abandon 
the reason and precedent of the United States Supreme Court, the 
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3rd, 4th and 5th Circuit Courts of Appeal, and the overwhelming 
majority of state supreme courts and strike down the ordinance 
before it. 
The State of Utah has not preempted the area of sex offenses; 
rather, it has granted boards of county commissioners great 
latitude to preserve the health and improve the morals, peace, 
and good order of its citizens. 
The replations imposed by the subject ordinance bear a 
reasonable relationship to the legislative purpose of curbing the 
use of massage parlors as shelters for illicit sex merchants. 
The appellants have the burden of proof in this case and 
they have failed to sustain that burden. The presumption of 
validity and constitutionality is unrebutted. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TED CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By ~e County Attorney 
151 East 2100 South 
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